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INTRODUCTION
In summarizing his opinion for the Court in District of Columbia v.
Heller,' Justice Scalia wrote: "we hold that the District's ban on handgun
possession in the home violates the Second Amendment, as does its
prohibition against rendering any lawful firearm in the home operable for
the purpose of immediate self-defense." Yet, the challenged District of
Columbia law did not merely forbid handgun possession in the home; it
banned possession of unlicensed handguns anywhere in the District, and
because the District prohibited the registration of handguns, the effect of
the handgun ban, coupled with restrictions on the storage of licensed long
guns, was to forbid most law-abiding private citizens from carrying
firearms of any sort anywhere in public.2
After Heller, can the District enforce its firearms prohibition in
public? The question is of more than theoretical interest because tough
enforcement of New York City's ban on public possession of firearms may
have contributed substantially to the dramatic decline in the City's violent
crime rate since the early 1990s.3 If the right recognized in Heller cannot
t Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell University Law School. For helpful
suggestions, comments and questions I am very grateful to Sherry Colb, Jeffrey Fagan, and
Steven Shiffrin.
1. District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821-22 (2008) (emphasis added).
2. See id. at 2788 (describing D.C. CODE §§ 7-2501.01(12), 7-2502.01(a), 7-
2502.02(a)(4), 7-2507.02 (2001)).
3. Although debate flourishes about the degree to which various factors caused the
decline in violent crime in New York and elsewhere, there is little doubt that targeting
illegal guns was a major component of the New York City Police Department's strategy in
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be limited to the home, then some of the progress New York City has made
in fighting crime could be in jeopardy, and more broadly, police
departments around the country could lose an important tool4-assuming
(as I shall for present purposes) that the Court eventually holds that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the
states and their subdivisions.
5
Respondent Dick Anthony Heller only challenged the District's gun
laws as applied to home possession and use of firearms.6 Accordingly, the
Supreme Court did not have to address, directly, the validity of those laws
as they may be applied in public. How should the Court resolve the public
possession question, in a case that squarely presents it? Commentators
who think, as I do, that the Court erred in Heller, would likely hope that the
Court limits the damage by holding that the home is different.7 But is there
a principled basis for doing so? Accepting Heller as good law, can one
plausibly say that the Second Amendment protects the private right to
possess and use firearms in self-defense at home, but not in public?
This Essay tentatively argues that the home/public line can be
defended. Part I reviews the reasoning of Heller itself, finding substantial
the relevant period. See ELIOT SPITZER, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE
OF N.Y., THE NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT'S "STOP & FRISK" PRACTICES 53 (1999),
available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/bureaus/civil-rights/pdfs/stp-frsk.pdf (last visited
Aug. 15, 2008) (stating that "Police Strategy No. 1, entitled 'Getting Guns Off the Streets of
New York,' sets forth the [New York City Police] Department's plan to eradicate gun
violence by stepping up efforts to find and seize illegal firearms" and noting that "[t]hese
strategies remain in effect through the present."). Based on the empirical data, it was and
remains reasonable to think that reducing the prevalence of guns on the streets would reduce
the overall rate of violent crime. See Jeffrey Fagan et al., Social Contagion of Violence, in
THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AND AGGRESSION 688, 692 (Daniel J.
Flannery et al. eds., 2007) (identifying guns "as a primary agent of violence contagion over
the most recent epidemic cycle").
4. See Jeffrey Fagan, Comment to EVALUATING GUN POLICY: EFFECTS ON CRIME AND
VIOLENCE 243, 244 (Jens Ludwig & Philip J. Cook, eds., 2003) (describing "impressive
results" of police practices targeting gun crimes and gun carrying in Indianapolis, Kansas
City, and Pittsburgh).
5. Heller does not address this question, although it does cast substantial doubt on the
Nineteenth Century decisions holding that the Second Amendment is not incorporated. See
Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535, 538 (1894); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264-65 (1886);
United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875). The Heller Court noted "that
Cruikshank also said that the First Amendment did not apply against the States and did not
engage in the sort of Fourteenth Amendment inquiry required by" the Twentieth Century
incorporation cases. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2813 n.23.
6. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
7. See Michael C. Dorf, What Does the Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 291, 294 (2000) (expressing sympathy for the "collective right" interpretation
of the Second Amendment while acknowledging that the provision has always been
somewhat puzzling).
226
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grounds in the opinion for extending the holding to public possession and
some grounds for limiting it to the home. Part II offers a normative
justification for limiting the right to the home. Part III offers an argument
rooted in the Court's First Amendment and right-of-privacy jurisprudence
for such a limit, and evaluates how receptive the Justices would likely be to
that argument.
I. WHAT THE HELLER COURT SAID ABOUT PUBLIC POSSESSION
The principal mode of analysis in Heller's majority opinion is public-
meaning originalism. Justice Scalia seeks the "normal meaning" that would
"have been known to ordinary citizens in the founding generation."8 Under
the Court's approach, the text of the Second Amendment would appear to
guarantee a right to public possession of firearms. The Court interprets
"keep Arms" to mean "have weapons" and "bear" to mean "carry." 9 Thus,
the people have a right to have and carry weapons. Nothing in the text of the
Second Amendment itself limits that right to the home, and it would be odd
to attribute to the founding generation the hidden intent to protect a right to
carry weapons from place to place but only within the confines of their
houses, from the drawing room to the parlor, say.
Moreover, the Heller opinion clearly contemplates the carrying of
firearms outside the home. For example, Justice Scalia opines that
Americans in the founding generation valued firearms for self-defense and
hunting even more highly than they valued such arms for militia service.10
And in trying to show that in the middle of the Nineteenth Century the
Second Amendment was understood to protect possession and use of
firearms outside of militia service, he quotes an 1856 speech by Charles
Sumner describing "the rifle" as the "tutelary protector against the red man
and the beast of the forest," and ascribing protection to "at least one article
in our National Constitution."" It is hard to imagine that either Senator
Sumner or Justice Scalia imagined the frontiersman encountering "the red
man" or "the beast of the forest" (as attacker or as prey) only in his home.
Likewise, Justice Scalia draws support from Nineteenth Century state
court decisions upholding a right to carry firearms openly and distinguishes
another state court decision denying a right to carry concealed weapons. 12
8. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2788.
9. Id. at 2792-93.
10. Id. at 2801.
11. Id. at 2807 (quoting Charles Sumner, The Crime Against Kansas (May 19-20,
1856), in AMERICAN SPEECHES: POLITICAL ORATORY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL
WAR 553, 606-07 (Ted Widmer, ed., 2006)).
12. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2809 (relying on Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846), and
2008]
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Clearly, the underlying cases and Justice Scalia are referring to the carrying
of weapons outside of the home.
Furthermore, the Heller opinion provides a number of examples of the
sorts of regulations that the majority thinks would pass muster under any
standard the Court would likely develop in subsequent cases. 13  These
include "laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings. . . . 14 Although Justice Scalia adds
that the list of permissible regulations is not intended to be exhaustive, if it
were possible for government to ban all firearms possession outside the
home, there would be little point in singling out "sensitive places."' 15 More
likely, Justice Scalia meant to leave open the possibility that additional
public places-such as airports--could be deemed sensitive.
Thus, prima facie, the logic and language of Heller extend to the
possession and use of firearms outside of the home. There could be
exceptions to the right of public carriage, but a complete ban on carrying
firearms outside the home would appear to violate the Second Amendment,
as understood in Heller.
Nonetheless, the Court did limit its official holding to home
possession and use. 16 To be sure, that was partly a response to the as-
applied challenge before the Justices, but this fact in turn raises the
question of why Mr. Heller chose to challenge the law only insofar as it
limited his possession of a loaded, working firearm at home. Presumably,
he so limited his claim because he thought that home possession and use
were more sympathetic than a right to carry handguns in public.
The majority appeared to agree. The Court characterizes the home as
a place "where the need for defense of self, family, and property is most
acute."' 17 In addition, the Court explains why handguns are especially
valuable for self-defense in the home:
It is easier to store [a handgun than a long gun] in a location that is
readily accessible in an emergency; it cannot easily be redirected or
wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use for those without the
upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a
burglar with one hand while the other hand dials the police.
State v. Chandler, 5 La. Ann. 489, 490 (1850), while distinguishing Aymette v. State, 21
Tenn. 154, 158 (1840)).
13. Id. at 2816-17.
14. Id. at 2817.
15. Id. at 2817 n.26.
16. Id. at2821-22.
17. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at2817.
18. Id. at 2818.
[Vol. 59:225
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The Court then concludes that "whatever else [the Second Amendment]
leaves to future evaluation, it surely elevates above all other interests the
right of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home."'19 Although hardly dispositive, the home-specific reasoning
and language of the Heller opinion leaves open the possibility of
distinguishing, and thus upholding, laws banning carrying firearms or
handguns in public.
To draw such a distinction in a principled manner, however, would
require more than pointing to some language in Heller. While the Heller
Court says that banning firearms possession in the home is an especially
egregious Second Amendment violation, it does not say that banning
firearms possession outside the home would be permissible. 20 Parts II and
III of this Essay offer two possible grounds for drawing the needed
distinction.
II. THE RELATIVE RISKS AND BENEFITS OF HOME AND PUBLIC
POSSESSION OF FIREARMS
Most obviously, future defenders of a ban on public possession of
firearms could build on the logic of Justice Scalia's Heller opinion. The
argument would emphasize the greater need for firearms in the home
relative to public places. Needing instant protection against a felonious
intruder, the home victim has no time to call on the aid of her neighbors or
the police. By contrast, the public itself, as well as the police, provide
protection outside the home.
Yet even if, on average, the police and fellow citizens provide greater
protection in public, they do not always do so. Just as the Court in Heller
conjures the image of the homeowner needing to reach for the handgun in
her night table to stop the rapist climbing through the window, we can
readily imagine a future case conjuring up the late-shift worker walking
home through a deserted alley in the wee hours of the morning.2' The
police cannot be everywhere, and so when an assailant leaps from his
hiding place, the law-abiding citizen in this scenario can defend himself, if
at all, only with his trusty handgun. Even if stylized, lamentably, such
scenarios are hardly fanciful, and if fear of the home intruder underscores
the value of firearms for the homeowner, so fear of the assailant lurking in
the alley underscores their value for the law-abiding citizen at large.
Perhaps, instead, the home/public line can be maintained based on the
19. Id. at 2821.
20. Id. at 2821-22.
21. See id. at 2818.
2008]
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greater risk posed by an armed public walking the streets. Laws forbidding
public carriage of firearms reduce the likelihood that verbal altercations or
fistfights turn deadly, even as they empower police to arrest criminals by
making it easier to distinguish them from the law-abiding public. To put
the point in a slogan, when carrying guns is outlawed, only outlaws provide
the police with probable cause for their arrest by carrying guns.
I find the foregoing argument persuasive, or at least sufficiently
plausible that I would want to leave to the democratic process the decision
whether to forbid the carrying of firearms in public. 22 However, accepting
Heller, we must begin with at least a presumption against any firearms
ban.23 The harm addressed by a ban on carrying firearms in public must be
at least as substantial as the harm addressed by a ban on firearms in the
home.
In fact, there are excellent policy reasons for a ban on firearms in the
home. As Justice Breyer noted in his dissent, the legislative history of the
D.C. ban included the finding that "[flor every intruder stopped by a
homeowner with a firearm, there are 4 gun-related accidents within the
home."24 To be sure, such statistics are contestable and contested. There
was no shortage of amicus briefs before the Supreme Court arguing that the
District's ban was either ineffective or counter-productive, and citing
scholarship purporting to back these claims statistically.
25
Notably, Justice Scalia does not say that he thinks that on balance
guns save innocent lives. Rather, he cites the same four-to-one ratio as
Justice Breyer, and then ignores it.26 The closest Justice Scalia comes-
and it is not all that close-to saying that finding a robust individual right
to armed self-defense in the Second Amendment advances important policy
22. For purposes of making a policy decision, lawmakers would need to balance the
supposed benefits of a public firearms ban against the supposed chief benefit of an armed
populace: the fear that a potential victim may be armed deters criminals from attacking.
23. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2818 n.27 (stating that the Constitution requires more than
a rational basis to sustain laws infringing upon specifically enumerated rights, such as those
protected by the Second Amendment) (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)).
24. Id. at 2854-55 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing Firearms Control Regulations Act of
1975: Hearing on H. Con. R. 694 Before the H. Comm. on the District of Columbia, 94th
Cong. H.R. Rep. No. 94-24, at 25 (1976) (Report by David A. Clarke, Chairperson, H.
Comm. on the Judiciary and Criminal Law)).
25. See, e.g., Brief of Academics as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, District of
Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 383520; Amicus Curiae
Brief of Mountain States Legal Foundation in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 405565; Brief of Criminologists et
al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct.
2783 (2008) (No. 07-290), 2008 WL 383535.
26. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2819 n.28.
[Vol. 59:225
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aims is to deem the claim that the Second Amendment is outmoded,
"perhaps debatable. '27 At bottom, the Heller majority does not credit the
policy arguments against gun control over the policy argument in favor of
gun control; it casts them aside as irrelevant.
If policy arguments in favor of the application of the District's
firearms ban to the home are irrelevant to Justice Scalia, it is not clear why
policy arguments in favor of a ban on public possession of firearms would
be relevant in a future case, unless those latter arguments were so much
stronger as to satisfy whatever brand of heightened scrutiny the Court
considers applicable to infringements on the Second Amendment. There is
little in the Heller opinion to suggest that the Court would so find.
III. PROTECTIONS FOR THE HOME IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL TEXT
Nonetheless, the right recognized in Heller could be confined to home
possession by an argument that takes account of the fact that the Court's
individual rights jurisprudence more broadly treats the home as special.
Stanley v. Georgia28 provides the closest analogy. Like the Second
Amendment, nothing in the text of the First Amendment suggests that its
protections would have any greater force in the home than outside it. 29
Nonetheless, in Stanley the Court held that home possession of obscene
materials could not be criminalized, even as it assumed arguendo that
public display and distribution of obscenity were unprotected. 30  The
Respondent's brief and one supporting amicus brief in Heller relied on
Stanley for the proposition that the home is special, and while the Heller
Court does not cite Stanley, its discussion of the home echoes the Stanley
approach.31  Accordingly, just as Stanley did not foreclose obscenity
prosecutions, so in a future case, Heller might not foreclose prosecution for
public possession of firearms.
Stanley was not the only rights case to treat the home as special. In
Griswold v. Connecticut,32 the Court constructed a general right of privacy
from the "penumbras" and "emanations" of the enumerated rights,
including two-the Third and Fourth Amendments-that expressly refer to
27. Id. at 2822.
28. See generally 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (holding even obscene materials not otherwise
protected by the First Amendment may be viewed in the privacy of one's home).
29. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. II with U.S. CONST. amend. I.
30. 394 U.S. at 567-68.
31. See Brief of Respondent at 50, available at
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs/07-08/07-290_Respondent.pdf; Brief of
Pink Pistols et al. (last visited Oct. 20, 2008) as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at
28, District of Columbia. v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008) (No. 07-290) 2008 WL 383521.
32. 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
2008]
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protection afforded people in their "houses." Although later extended to
conduct outside the home, the right recognized in Griswold was closely
connected to what the Court called "the sanctity of a man's home and the
privacies of life."33  Thus, in Lawrence v. Texas,34 the Court's second
sentence emphasized that the state's efforts to regulate private sexual
conduct between consenting adults were especially suspect because they
intruded into the home.
An argument built upon Stanley, Griswold, and Lawrence could have
provided the Heller majority with an answer to what, on its face, looked
like a devastating criticism leveled by Justice Stevens in his dissent. He
complained that "not a word in the constitutional text even arguably
supports the Court's overwrought and novel description of the Second
Amendment as 'elevat[ing] above all other interests' 'the right of law-
abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home."'
35
The majority might have responded that in fact the "constitutional text"
indeed manifests a special concern with the protection of the home, but the
relevant constitutional text is the Bill of Rights as a whole, including the
Third and Fourth Amendments with their express references to the home.
This answer would have placed Heller squarely in line with Stanley,
Griswold, and Lawrence.
More directly to the present point, placing Heller alongside these
other home-focused cases would provide a ready basis for distinguishing it
when a public possession case comes before the Court. A person's right to
privacy in her library does not protect her against prosecution for publicly
peddling or purchasing obscenity;36 the right of married (and unmarried)
couples to use contraceptives in the privacy of their home does not entitle
them to use contraceptives (for their intended purpose) in public parks;37
the right of same-sex sexual intimacy in the privacy of the home likewise
does not extend to public places; 38 and so, it could be argued, the right to
use a handgun to defend hearth and home does not necessarily entail a right
to carry handguns on public streets and sidewalks.
To be sure, these analogies are not perfect. We might think that
obscenity and sexual activity lose their protected status in public because
33. Id. (quoting Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
34. 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). "In our tradition the State is not omnipresent in the
home." Id.
35. Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2831 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion).
36. See Stanley, 394 U.S. at 561.
37. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498-99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
38. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
[Vol. 59:225
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they cause harm in public-they offend the sensibilities of others, including
minors-that they do not cause in private. To say the same thing about the
possession and use of firearms requires us to say that firearms pose some
danger when carried or used in public that they do not pose when possessed
or used in the home, or at least that they pose some greater danger in
public. As we saw in Part II, that is not obviously the case. Still, the
notion of D.C. residents walking the streets, including the streets just
beyond the Supreme Court grounds, with visible sidearms, could well be
upsetting to the Justices in a way and to a degree that Mr. Heller's night-
table handgun was not.
Moreover, as a strictly doctrinal matter, the analogy between Heller
and Stanley remains strong because in fact, the doctrinal distinction
between home possession and public possession of obscenity does not turn
on the ostensible harm that obscenity does outside the home. If it did, then
there would be a First Amendment right to carry obscene materials in
public, so long as they were concealed. Yet the Supreme Court has clearly
rejected this extension of Stanley, a case now best understood as protecting
the privacy of the home against excessive government snooping.39 We can
make the most sense of Stanley as a case in which the Court invoked values
marked by the text of the Fourth Amendment to inform its understanding of
the First Amendment. 4
0
Heller leaves open the same path with respect to the Second
Amendment. For whatever reason, the Heller majority thought that the
argument for firearms possession and use was at its strongest in the home.
To provide that intuition with doctrinal and textual support, if not necessarily
empirical support, the Court could profitably invoke Stanley and its other
cases affording heightened protection to individual rights in the home.
39. See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352, 354-55 (1971) (upholding law
banning use of the mails to distribute obscenity); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971) (upholding ban on importation of obscene materials
even if concealed in luggage). See Reidel, 402 U.S. at 354-55 (rejecting a claim based on
Stanley where the claimant could not show how enforcement of the challenged law would
result in "unwanted governmental intrusions into the privacy of [his] home").
40. See Sherry F. Colb, The Qualitative Dimension of Fourth Amendment
"Reasonableness, " 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1642, 1703-04 (1998) (arguing that Stanley should
be understood as resting on the values associated with the Fourth Amendment); Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 207 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the Stanley Court
anchored its holding in the Fourth Amendment's special protection for the individual in his
home"). The Hardwick majority asserted that Stanley "was firmly grounded in the First
Amendment," but that statement, along with the holding of Hardwick, has clearly been
superseded by Lawrence, which in addition to expressly overruling Hardwick, re-established
the importance of the home in the Court's rights jurisprudence. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195;
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
2008]
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CONCLUSION
Throughout the Heller majority opinion, the First Amendment is
invoked as the gold standard of constitutional interpretation.41 The Court
rejects any argument for construing the Second Amendment that would be
rejected if applied analogously to the guarantees listed in the First
Amendment. 42  Thus, in principle, the Heller majority ought to be
sympathetic to an argument that builds on the Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence, as the distinction based on Stanley v. Georgia does.
Griswold and Lawrence, however, are another story. Both Justice
Scalia, the author of Heller, and Justice Thomas, who joined his opinion,
have expressed reservations about the whole project of judicial recognition
for unenumerated rights,43 and two other Justices in the Heller majority,
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, might be thought, on general
ideological grounds, to share those doubts.44 The fifth and final member of
the Heller majority, however, was Justice Kennedy, the author of Lawrence.
Although there is no reason to assume that he would vote to uphold a ban on
public possession of firearms, there is reason to suppose that he would at
least give a sympathetic hearing to the argument sketched here. After Heller,
can gun control advocates reasonably ask for much more than that?
41. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-2822 (often citing First Amendment interpretation as
a guide to the Second Amendment).
42. See Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2791-92 (invoking the First Amendment protection given
to modem media to show that the Second Amendment should extend to modem weaponry);
id. at 2797 (noting that both the First and Second Amendment use the singular "right" to
protect multiple rights); id. at 2799 (arguing that because the First Amendment was not
unlimited at the Founding, early limits on weapons possession do not undermine the Court's
interpretation of the Second Amendment); id. at 2816 (pointing out that the first Supreme
Court case to strike down a law under the First Amendment was decided nearly a century
and a half after its adoption); id. at 2821 (asserting that both Second and First Amendment
tacitly incorporated their well-known exceptions).
43. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 91-92 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(rejecting the unenumerated right of parents to direct the upbringing of their children); id. at
80 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment) (raising the possibility that, in a different case,
he would consider an argument that all of the Court's "substantive due process cases were
wrongly decided and that the original understanding of the Due Process Clause precludes
judicial enforcement of unenumerated rights under that constitutional provision").
44. Cf Michael C. Dorf, Does Federal Executive Branch Experience Explain Why
Some Republican Supreme Court Justices "Evolve" and Others Don 't?, 1 HARV. L. &
POL'Y REV. 457, 465 (2007) (predicting that the two Justices appointed by President George
W. Bush "will prove very conservative").
234 [Vol. 59:225
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